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Abstract 
 
A relevant mismatch between tax and expenditure decentralization characterizes many industrialized 
countries. The former is usually less pronounced than the latter, resulting in asymmetric fiscal 
decentralization arrangements. After a brief discussion of the stylized facts in advanced countries, we 
investigate the nature of this asymmetry using a theoretical framework that explains why it is difficult 
to tackle it, despite a consensus on the benefits of a well-balanced decentralization process. We find 
that asymmetry is intrinsic to fiscal decentralization, even in a scenario where clear advantages from 
well-developed fiscally decentralized systems arise. This implies that both empirical and theoretical 
contributions would benefit by taking into account the welfare-reducing asymmetric nature of fiscal 
decentralization. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent decades have witnessed a significant increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization in 
many countries (OECD 2006, 2009a). These reforms have promoted the autonomy and responsibility 
of sub-central governments with the aim of improving the efficiency in the allocation of public 
resources and of the whole public sector as well (Stigler 1957; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972).
1
 Some 
authors have even argued that such reforms have positively affected government quality (Kyriacou 
and Roca-Sagalés 2011). However, there is evidence of a widespread mismatch between expenditure 
and tax decentralization. “While both revenue and spending became more decentralized over the past 
twenty years, spending decentralization clearly outpaced revenue decentralization, resulting in a 
higher vertical fiscal imbalance and growing intergovernmental grants” (OECD 2102, p. 4).  
Most recent fiscal federalism reforms in OECD countries have considerably changed the sub-
central fiscal architecture especially on the spending and transfer side, with considerably less 
intervention on intergovernmental tax revenue systems. While new responsibilities for the provision 
of public services have been assigned to lower levels, intergovernmental grant systems have been 
updated without tackling the asymmetry between the expenditure and the revenue side (see Blöchliger 
and Vammalle 2012 for further details). As a result, local governments
2
 cannot exert a full degree of 
autonomy over their different types of revenues (own taxes, piggybacked and shared taxes, and 
grants) used to finance their expenditures (Claeys and Martire 2011).  
Not only has this worked against the benefit principle of taxation ensuring adequate coverage of 
local expenditures (Musgrave 1983; King 1984), but it has also been observed that “a higher sub-
central government tax share could increase efficiency and accountability” (OECD 2009b, p. 5). 
Similar prescriptions are envisaged by Mc-Lure and Martinez-Vazquez (2000) according to whom a 
stable and meaningful decentralization process requires the assignment of expenditure responsibilities 
to be combined with a sufficient budgetary autonomy to carry out the assigned tasks at each 
governmental level. Shah (1998) also points out that governments at all levels should bear the 
financial burden of their decisions. 
However, the fiscal federalism literature does not add much to these guidelines, and typically 
assumes that lower levels of government both collect taxes and spend funds equally, resulting in sub-
central authorities classified either as low-tax–low-services or high-tax–high-services (Bardhan 2002). 
Given the existing decentralization arrangements, these assumptions appear to be particularly 
problematic and not supported by the data (see Section 2 for more details). For example, 
accountability is normally perceived to be a welfare-enhancing feature of decentralization (Tommasi 
and Weinschelbaum 2007), but it can only exist when local governments are responsible for the 
financing sources used to cover their expenditures, i.e. when balanced decentralization structures are 
                                                     
1 Although there is a broad consensus on the benefits in terms of efficiency related to decentralization, there are authors 
claiming that decentralization does not necessarily imply more efficiency, especially if expenditure and tax decentralization 
decisions are not taken at the same time (Lundholm 2008). 
2 We use ‘local’ as a synonym of ‘sub-central’ throughout the paper. 
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adopted. This is consistent with the works by Rodden (2003), Jack (2004), and Rodríguez-Pose et al. 
(2009) who affirm that the effectiveness of expenditure decentralization depends on its being 
accompanied by decentralization of revenue powers, rather than being funded through revenue 
sharing and intergovernmental grant schemes.  
Related to that, a number of authors have recently started to investigate the different implications 
of revenue versus expenditure decentralization in relation to a number of important economic 
variables, among which: GDP growth (e.g., Jin and Zou 2005; Gemmell et al. 2013), fiscal discipline 
(e.g., Afonso and Hauptmeier 2009; Escolano et al. 2012), and income distribution (Boadway et al. 
2003; Sacchi and Salotti 2014a). As expected, this has resulted in different empirical findings 
depending on the adopted measure of fiscal decentralization.
3
  
It could be argued that the different effects of expenditure decentralization with respect to those of 
revenue decentralization may be due to the difference between the two, i.e. to their asymmetry. For 
example, Gemmell et al. (2013) find that spending decentralization is associated with lower economic 
growth, while revenue decentralization with higher growth. Since OECD countries are substantially 
more spending- than revenue-decentralized, this result suggests that reducing expenditure 
decentralization and increasing tax decentralization would be growth-enhancing. This may be due to 
the reduction in the asymmetry achieved with higher revenue decentralization, rather than being due 
to a larger impact of revenue decentralization per se. Similarly, Blöchlinger and Égert (2013) study 
the impact of decentralization on economic growth and conclude that the revenue-based 
decentralization indicators deliver results both statistically and economically more significant than 
spending-based indicators. Again, this may be interpreted as a beneficial effect related to the 
reduction of the decentralization asymmetry, reminding of the Oates’ hypothesis (1972) according to 
which a close match between spending assignments and revenue discretion at sub-national levels 
maximizes the efficiency gains of decentralization.  
Despite the prominence of this theoretical recommendation, the literature has not devoted much 
attention to the implications of the asymmetric nature of fiscal decentralization and the reasons behind 
the non-alignment of expenditure and tax decentralization remain to be studied. Most authors prefer to 
concentrate on the distinction between political/administrative and fiscal decentralization (e.g., Bosch 
and Durán 2008), and on the consequences of the effective degree of autonomy granted to local 
governments (e.g., Thornton 2007). 
We aim at achieving a better comprehension of the fiscal mismatch characterizing the sub-central 
tiers of government of most industrialized countries by studying the link between the local tax 
assignment issue (Liberati 2011) and the expenditure task problem (OECD 2009c). We firstly use 
some data to illustrate the fiscal imbalance mentioned above. The lack of corrective actions 
                                                     
3 This means that studies using parsimonious ways to measure the degree of decentralization may end up blurring the 
different implications of decentralizing the two sides of the budget (Akai and Sakata 2002, Thieben 2003), or may see their 
results spoiled by potential measurement issues or because they overestimate the extent of autonomy given to local 
governments. 
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documented by recent studies (OECD 2012) emerges from the simple descriptive statistics that we 
present. Then, we set up a theoretical framework with advantages assigned to well-balanced 
decentralization, i.e. with strong linkages between spending and taxation decisions at the local level. 
We find that even in a scenario favorable to symmetrical fiscal decentralization, the 
expenditure/revenue mismatch emerges as one of its unavoidable features. This yields interesting 
implications for both the empirical and theoretical analyses dealing with fiscal decentralization, as 
neglecting this asymmetric nature may lead to misleading outcomes and conclusions due to the 
omission of the important consequences that it may have on welfare, fiscal discipline, and GDP 
growth.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates some facts on the 
differences between tax and expenditure decentralization in advanced economies. Section 3 develops 
the theoretical framework analyzing the nature of the asymmetry. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Stylized facts  
Existing data confirm that a number of countries are characterized by an asymmetric mix of 
expenditure and tax decentralization, with the tax revenues relatively more centralized than the former 
(Dziobek et al. 2011). Table 1 contains data for 26 industrialized countries gathered from two 
different sources, that is the OECD and Gemmell et al. (2013), although similar evidence could be 
obtained using IMF-GFS data, as well as data by Stegarescu (2005 - see also Thornton 2007, Sacchi 
and Salotti 2014b). The percentages reported in the table represent the proportion of sub-central 
expenditures not covered by sub-central taxes; the earliest and the latest observations available from 
the two datasets are reported. 
The numbers contained in Table 1 are always positive and substantially larger than zero, although 
there are significant cross-country differences.
4
 This means that in all countries there is a significant 
proportion of public expenditures in the hands of sub-central governments which relies on 
intergovernmental transfers rather than sub-central tax revenues (including all types of local taxes, i.e. 
own, shared, piggybacked, etc.) for their financing. In some cases, only about 30% of local spending 
is financed by local taxes (in the Netherlands), and in most cases the values are close to 50%. This 
evidence supports the claims reported in Section 1 about the existence of widespread fiscal 
imbalances. 
An even more interesting issue is whether this mismatch has been corrected over time or if there 
is a tendency of expenditure and tax decentralization to converge. With regards to OECD countries, it 
has been observed that: “in the decade 1995-2005 (…) the vertical fiscal gap has increased; hence, 
decentralization has become more asymmetric” (OECD 2009b, p. 4). However, one may expect short-
                                                     
4
 There are only two exceptions: Iceland in 1972 according to the Gemmell et al. (2013) data, and Spain in 2012 
according to the OECD data, although we are inclined to think of those as data issues, rather than tax 
decentralization being actually higher than expenditure decentralization (the Spanish data are inconsistent across 
the two data sources). 
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term asymmetries due to diverse governments’ abilities to borrow. Those imbalances should be short-
lived and should not have any long-run impact on the decentralization process.  
 
Table 1: proportion of local expenditures not covered by local taxes 
Australia 46.4% (1972) 37.2% (2005)
Austria 14.1% (1995) 18.7% (2012) 2.0% (1972) 19.9% (2005)
Belgium 43.2% (1985) 56.8% (2012) 38.7% (1972) 55.4% (2005)
Canada 22.0% (1970) 17.0% (2011) 21.3% (1972) 16.1% (2005)
Czech Republic 20.9% (1995) 20.1% (2012)
Denmark 39.7% (1990) 52.8% (2012) 47.3% (1972) 40.4% (2004)
Estonia 45.7% (1995) 39.2% (2012)
Finland 28.5% (1975) 29.3% (2012) 31.8% (1972) 30.9% (2005)
France 20.0% (1993) 21.3% (2012) 42.1% (1972) 22.7% (2005)
Germany 13.8% (1991) 9.8% (2012) 22.0% (1972) 9.3% (2005)
Greece 39.0% (1995) 48.3% (2012) 25.6% (1972) 3.4% (2005)
Hungary 54.8% (1995) 46.4% (2012)
Iceland 6.2% (1995) 5.6% (2012) -5.77% (1972) 16.0% (2004)
Ireland 64.8% (1990) 42.6% (2012) 30.3% (1972) 43.8% (2005)
Italy 75.2% (1980) 34.9% (2012) 57.0% (1973) 35.3% (2005)
Luxembourg 41.9% (1990) 47.4% (2012) 42.1% (1972) 41.8% (2005)
Netherlands 68.6% (1969) 67.9% (2012) 71.0% (1972) 64.7% (2005)
New Zealand 19.2% (1972) 15.4% (2005)
Norway 44.6% (1996) 59.3% (2012) 11.5% (1972) 41.3% (2005)
Poland 38.8% (2005) 43.0% (2012)
Portugal 20.9% (1995) 12.9% (2012) 1.4% (1974) 7.9% (2005)
Slovak Republic 52.9% (1995) 26.2% (2012)
Slovenia 29.1% (1995) 31.0% (2012)
Spain 48.6% (1995) -5.2% (2012) 51.4% (1972) 31.4% (2005)
Sweden 8.9% (1993) 22.0% (2012) 35.1% (1972) 20.1% (2005)
Switzerland 16.0% (1990) 17.6% (2012) 27.5% (1972) 11.2% (2003)
UK 63.3% (1990) 65.9% (2012) 54.1% (1972) 63.2% (2005)
USA 10.3% (1970) 3.8% (2012) 15.2% (1972) 11.2% (2005)
Data source / 
Countries
OECD Gemmell et al. (2013)
 
 
According to the numbers reported in Table 1, in 13 countries out of 26 (using OECD data; in 7 
countries out of 22 using data by Gemmell et al. 2013) the imbalance has increased over time. Even in 
the countries where the imbalance has decreased, it remains substantial, as a non-negligible proportion 
of local expenditures is not covered by local taxes, and therefore needs to be financed with 
intergovernmental transfers. Also, in some cases it only decreased because of a lower expenditure 
decentralization and stable tax decentralization (e.g. in Hungary). 
Therefore, not only it is common to observe a mismatch between expenditure and tax 
decentralization, but also there is no evidence of widespread tendencies to reduce the asymmetry. 
 6 
Why are central governments in industrialized countries ‘reluctant’ to increase the autonomy of local 
governments, particularly on the revenue side? The next section of the paper proposes a theoretical 
framework providing an explanation for the existence of the persistent tax/expenditure 
decentralization mismatch even by assuming that individuals favorably perceive well-balanced fiscal 
decentralization.
5
  
 
3. The theoretical framework  
We assume an economy with total population N  and two different levels of government, the central 
government and two regions ( 2,1j ) of equal size, i.e. 221 NNN  , without loss of generality 
in the results. Central and sub-central governments provide non-rival public goods and services of 
different type (respectively, Cg  and jLg ). For instance, jLg  may refer to infrastructure or education 
services provided to citizens belonging to the region according to local preferences. We follow the 
Decentralization Theorem of Oates (1972) by assuming individual preferences for local public goods 
to be homogenous within-region and heterogeneous across regions, thus different 
jL
g  are allowed. 
We use Lg  hereafter in order to simplify the notation. In turn, public services supplied by the central 
government, Cg , are of uniform type and may include national public goods (e.g., defense and 
stabilization policies). Our approach is similar to that of Stegarescu (2009) even though with a 
different baseline scenario and different aims.  
In providing public services to individuals, both sub-central and central governments perfectly 
execute the policies determined by the representative individual according to a demand-driven 
political process. We do not include any political economy considerations as we focus on the 
relationship between expenditure and tax decentralization.  Also, our model assumes that stratification 
á la Tiebout (1956) has already taken place and, since individuals are already sorted according to their 
preferences, there is no role for mobility (Alesina and Spolaore 1997).  
We define the degree of expenditure decentralization as the local government share in total public 
services provided in the regions: ggL /  where LC ggg   represents total (central plus local) 
public expenditure, as in Stegarescu (2009 – for similar applications see Panizza 1999; Alegre 2010). 
Thus, we can re-define local and central public goods as functions of the expenditure decentralization 
degree and total spending, i.e. ggL   and  ggC  1 , with the parameter   identifying the 
level of expenditure decentralization in aggregate terms.  
                                                     
5 Our model focuses on the demand side of the question, which has been explored by other researchers in relation to different 
matters. For example, Eichenberger (1994) studies the individuals’ benefits from fiscal decentralization in an analysis on the 
citizens’ incentives to make use of the voice and exit options. A more recent study by Bähr (2008) proves that sub-national 
autonomy positively affects the effectiveness of the European Union’s regional policy in promoting growth when the states 
exhibit a higher degree of decentralization. 
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Representative individuals in both regions pay the fixed contribution jp  to finance the cost of 
public provision, which is equal to the per capita costs of local and central public spending: 
2N
g
N
g
p LCj   (therefore there is no possibility of debt-financing in this model). One part of jp  is 
collected by the local governments (to finance, at least partially, Lg ) and the other part of jp  goes to 
the central government (to finance Cg  and, via grants, Lg  for the part exceeding local revenues).  
Based upon these assumptions, the representative individual’s utility function in region j is given 
by the following:  
 
                   jjCLj pyggU
j 

lnln     (3.1) 
 
where jy  is personal income, which also represents regional income as we have assumed 
homogeneous income among individuals within the same local unit. Income distribution issues are 
beyond the scope of the paper as we focus on efficiency considerations related to expenditure 
decentralization.
6
 The parameter   (satisfying 10   ) represents individual preferences for 
public spending provided by the central government ( Cg ). Such preferences are assumed (without 
loss of generality) to be homogenous across regions, i.e. 1 2    .
7
  
The parameter j  (  from now onwards, without loss of generality, and satisfying 0 1  ) 
proxies for the regional preference for local expenditure. We assume that this preference is positively 
related to the part of such spending financed through own local taxes rather than grants, reflecting the 
fact that accountable and benevolent local governments will be able to use their spending more 
effectively. This is in agreement with all the considerations reported above on the higher efficiency of 
symmetric fiscal decentralization. The relevance of this issue is also proved by the recent efforts of 
international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in building 
decentralization indicators taking into account, other things equal, the vertical imbalance phenomenon 
                                                     
6 That is why we adopt a quasi-linear utility function that rules out income effects for the two types of public expenditure. 
Moreover, we are not interested in dealing with the individual choice between private and public consumption and how 
income is spent, so we do not include directly the private good into the utility function.  
7 We could allow preferences for central government services to differ across regions as in Stegarescu (2009) without 
obtaining different results. However, we choose to simply focus just on pure economic factors promoting fiscal 
decentralization, rather than relying on differences in preferences (see also Arzaghi and Henderson 2005). Also, central and 
local governments may also provide different components of the same function (e.g., local primary schools and national 
university) as it commonly happens in many developed countries. In this respect, one can observe - also historically - a 
frequent overlapping of responsibilities between different tiers of government, which has led to implementing the same 
function by the central government and sub-central authorities. 
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(by focusing on the percentage of expenditures financed with sub-national governments’ own source 
revenues minus transfers from other levels of government).
8
  
Thus, in our model more fiscal autonomy granted to sub-central authorities should be linked to 
(and captured by) higher values of  , because such an arrangement is likely to yield more benefits to 
citizens thanks to well-tied revenue and expenditure decisions. Given the existing asymmetry between 
expenditure and tax decentralization (with the former normally more pronounced than the latter), this 
is likely to correspond to a preference for a higher level of the latter and, therefore, for a higher degree 
of tax autonomy. The idea is that citizens perceive positively the role of tax decentralization as it is a 
byword for sufficient budgetary autonomy to carry out the assigned spending responsibilities (McLure 
and Martinez-Vazquez 2000) and can favor more accountability and transparency in local financing 
mechanisms (see also Bordignon and Minelli 2001). The theoretical basis for this assumption is 
provided by the existing literature (see Weingast 2009, 2014 for extensive reviews) suggesting that 
the best way to enforce the effectiveness of the decentralization process is to assign significant tax 
autonomy and decision power to local governments. As pointed out by Bordignon and Piazza (2010, 
p. 2), “it is self-financing, more than decentralization per se, the key ingredient of a successful 
decentralization process.” Indeed, own resources are seen to make local governments more likely 
accountable for their fiscal decision (Bahl and Linn 1992; McLure 1998; Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab 2003) as well as residents more informed on how representatives spend public money (Boetti 
et al. 2012 demonstrated that this also increases the local governments’ efficiency). All those aspects 
are captured in our model by the parameter  , which positively affects individual welfare: more tax 
decentralization and autonomy increases the benefit of local spending ( Lg ). 
It seems natural to assume that individuals’ preferences for central spending,  , are influenced 
by   (and therefore by the degree of tax decentralization), although the sign of this effect is unclear a 
priori. For example, demand for goods provided by the central government can become relatively less 
important when the local government is capable of providing public goods more effectively because 
of its being more fiscally autonomous. On the other hand, there could also be a sort of 
complementarity effect: when the degree of tax decentralization increases, citizens may prefer higher 
central spending because the central government can ensure a higher quality/quantity of its services 
by redirecting resources from grants to the financing of Cg . This gives rise to an indirect impact of   
on the utility function through its marginal effect on   (i.e.  ), that can be either positive or 
negative. 
Substituting Lg  and Cg  both in jp  and in the utility function, we can re-write equation (2.1) as 
follows: 
                                                     
8 For further details see the work done by The World Bank Intergovernmental Relations and Subnational Finance Thematic 
Group prepared for the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network (Frank and Martinez-Vazquez 
2014). 
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   
 1
ln ln 1j
g
U g g
N
 
 

         (3.2) 
 
Differentiating with respect to g  and  , we then obtain the optimal level of expenditure 
decentralization and total public expenditure for the inhabitants of region j: 
 
 * 2
2
N
g          (3.3) 
and 
*
2


 


       (3.4) 
 
Since 
** 0
g
g


 

, the higher  , the higher total public spending. On the other hand, 
 
 
*
2
2*
2


 

  

 
 
, which implies that 
*
 ≶0. By recalling that there is a positive relationship 
between   and tax decentralization, this means that the correlation between tax and expenditure 
decentralization  is ambiguous. Indeed, the linkage between local tax autonomy and the degree of 
expenditure decentralization is also affected by the marginal effect of tax decentralization on the 
preferences for central public goods provision, represented by  . When the latter is relatively small 
(i.e. 



 ), tax decentralization and expenditure decentralization are positively associated 
(
* 0  ); otherwise (i.e. 



 ), the opposite conclusion can be drawn ( * 0  ). This can be 
explained by the fact that a higher preference for central spending may lead to more tax centralization 
in order to finance such spending, with consequences on the investment and administrative costs for 
establishing tax collection units and potential economies of scale in processing those taxes. This may 
influence local governments causing a lack of correspondence between the two sides of their budgets.  
Thus, tax decentralization is not necessarily positively correlated with expenditure 
decentralization, even assuming its beneficial impact on the individual welfare. The ambiguous nature 
of this correlation, even in a framework designed to be favorable to tax decentralization, contributes to 
explain the persistency of the fiscal mismatch between local tax revenue and decentralized 
expenditure that characterizes many industrialized countries.  
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4. Conclusions 
Most advanced economies are characterized by a relevant mismatch between tax and expenditure 
decentralization, with the former normally being more limited than the latter. Our paper firstly 
illustrates some stylized facts and then studies the asymmetric nature of these fiscal decentralization 
arrangements. Using a theoretical framework that assumes that individuals positively perceive a 
balanced and well-defined fiscal decentralization process, we find that there is nothing suggesting that 
expenditure and tax decentralization should converge, as there are no apparent mechanisms ensuring 
that this should happen. Thus, we conclude that asymmetry is intrinsic to fiscal decentralization. 
Future theoretical and empirical contributions would benefit by taking this feature into consideration 
rather than unrealistically assuming perfectly balanced decentralization processes. 
Our result seems particularly relevant given the evidence of adverse effects on the economy of 
asymmetric decentralization. A number of recent contributions (e.g., von Hagen and Foremny 2013; 
Marcos and López Laborda 2013) prove that decentralizing exclusively on the expenditure side, but 
not the revenue side, weakens fiscal discipline. In Spain, for example, some design characteristics of 
the financing system may have aggravated the problem as, despite the progress made in fiscal co-
responsibility over recent years, it seems that the autonomous regions have yet to consider their 
budgetary restrictions as binding (Lago Peñas 2013). The response of the central government to this 
problem has been to impose a centralized and hierarchical control of regional budgets, contributing to 
enlarge the local fiscal mismatch between revenue and expenditure. 
The recent crisis of 2007-09 may have aggravated the problem. Given the importance of property 
taxes in the revenue-side of the sub-national budgets in most industrialized countries (Liberati and 
Sacchi 2013), the widespread falls of housing market prices have determined a substantial decrease in 
sub-central revenues. This implies that local governments may now be less able to comply with the 
increasing expenditure responsibilities that have been assigned to them. Canavire-Bacarreza and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2013) observe that this can damage citizens’ confidence and cause central 
governments to use the crisis as a mean to justify decelerating (or even reversing) the decentralization 
process (particularly in those countries where decentralization does not have a long tradition and/or 
where it has been subject to controversy in the past). Thus, the decentralized expenditure/revenue 
mismatch documented by our study assumes seems to be particular relevant today. The 
macroeconomic policies put in place during economic downturns and the continuously deteriorating 
budget balances may lead to more asymmetric fiscal decentralization with additional adverse 
consequences on the economy. 
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